Contents for IJSF Issue 3:4
| Editor’s Note: Time for a Change and a Thank You, pp. 183-184 Authors: Dennis Howard |
| Abstract:It¡¯s hard to believe that the International Journal of Sport Finance (IJSF) is soon to begin its fourth year. It has been my privilege to serve as the Editor-in-Chief since the inception of the journal in February 2006. The original plan was for me to serve a three-year term as editor. The succession plan anticipated moving the editorship to another country in support of our intentions to recognize and stimulate topically relevant work from a globally diverse and multidisciplinary perspective. |
| Executive Interview, pp. 185-188 Authors: Paul Swangard |
| Abstract:An interview with Heidi Ueberroth, President, Global Marketing Partnerships and International Business Operations, National Basketball Association. |
| Vend It Like Beckham: David Beckham’s Effect on MLS Ticket Sales, pp. 189-195 Authors: Robert A. Lawson, Kathleen Sheehan, and E. Frank Stephenson |
| Abstract:In January 2007, Major League Soccer (MLS) announced that international soccer sensation David Beckham would be joining the league playing for the LA Galaxy. This paper examines Beckham¡¯s effect on MLS ticket sales for the 2007 season. Depending on specification, our results indicate that Beckham increased ticket sales as a share of stadium capacity by about 55 percentage points. We then use these results to evaluate MLS¡¯s Designated Player Rule and to perform a back-of-the-envelope calculation of Beckham¡¯s benefit to the LA Galaxy. |
| Incentives for Post-Apprehension Self-Punishment: University Self-Sanctions for NCAA Infractions, pp. 196-209 Authors: Jason A. Winfree and Jill J. McCluskey |
| Abstract:This paper analyzes the financial incentives for entities to self-impose punishments post-apprehension but before the enforcement body imposes punishment. We argue that violators punish themselves in order to affect the level and type of total punishment. Violators may be able to choose the punishment that minimizes lost revenue. The model includes an enforcing body whose objective is to be perceived as fair by the public. We consider the case of university self-sanctions for National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) violations to test our self-punishment model using data from Division I schools¡¯ major infractions of NCAA rules. The estimation results show that university self-imposed punishments can significantly affect the form or type of the final punishment they receive from the NCAA in response to a violation of NCAA rules. |
| The Impact of a Professional Sports Franchise on County Employment and Wages, pp. 210-227 Authors: John Jasina and Kurt Rotthoff |
| Abstract:Stadium boosters have long used the promise of economic development as a means to gain public support for financing local sports teams. Past research has shown little or no impact on employment or income when viewed at the MSA level. This paper expands the current literature on the economic impact of professional sports franchises. Following Coates and Humphreys (2003), we look at employment and wages at the county level using detailed SIC and NAICS industry codes. We find mixed results on employment within a county but find a negative effect on the payrolls within specific industries. |
| Estimating Baseball Salary Equations from 1961-2005: A Look at Changes in Major League Compensation, pp. 228-238 Authors: Gary Stone and Louis J. Pantuosco |
| Abstract:This study estimates Major League Baseball (MLB) player salaries for three distinct periods of time. The data from the first time period, 1961 through 1973, were collected in 1974, but analysis of that set has never been published. During that period the reserve clause was fully in effect. The second period, 1974 through 1983, captures the early years of arbitration and free agency. The third period, 1999 through 2005, represents the modern era. The estimates specify that the salary productivity elasticities have increased over time for slugging average, player durability, and player consistency; this result indicates that over time owners have placed more value on these measures of player productivity. The model also implies that teams located in more densely populated areas are better able to compensate their players, particularly their pitchers. We conclude that our model explains salaries well in the 1961-1973 and 1999-2005 periods, but the regression estimates reveal a less pronounced relationship between the marginal revenue product and MLB wages in the early years of arbitration and free agency (1974-1983). |
| Market Power in the National Football League, pp. 239-244 Authors: Stacey L. Brook and Aju J. Fenn |
| Abstract:Much of the sport economics literature is able to demonstrate that teams have downward-sloping demand curves that imply market power, but there has been no formal test of this hypothesis. This paper provides an initial empirical test of market power for the NFL during the 1995 to 1999 seasons. We employ the price-cost margin methods under constant returns to scale as outlined by Neumann and Haid (1985) and Martin (1988).The two-stage least squares estimates, which control for the endogeneity of the price-cost margin and attendance as a percentage of total capacity, suggest that market power exists for the NFL during the 1995 to 1999 seasons. |
