Contents for IJSF Issue 1:3
|Executive Interview: Allan Duckworth
Authors: Bill Gerrard
|Abstract:An interview with Allan Duckworth, Chief Executive of Burnden Leisure.
|Evaluating Inelastic Ticket Pricing Models
Authors: Stacey L. Brook
|Abstract:Economists have been perplexed by the overwhelming evidence that sports teams set ticket prices in the inelastic range of spectator demand. In response, a number of profit-maximizing explanations have been proposed in the literature explaining why sports teams set ticket prices in the inelastic range of spectator demand, yet an evaluation of the proposed theories is missing. Therefore, using National Football League team data covering the 1995 through the 1999 seasons is employed to: a) determine if NFL teams do set ticket prices in the inelastic range of spectator demand, and b) evaluate various inelastic sports ticket pricing models.
|Financing Intercollegiate Athletics: The Role of Monitoring and Enforcing NCAA Recruiting Regulations
Authors: Brad R. Humphreys, Jane E. Ruseski
|Abstract:Many economists view the NCAA as a cartel in the market for college athletes. Financially, this cartel allows NCAA members to attract and retain college athletes for the price of a ¡°grant-in-aid¡± without competitively bidding for the labor services of student-athletes, greatly reducing operating costs relative to a competitive market for athletes. A functioning cartel must have both monitoring of the members and an enforcement mechanism to punish violators. We investigate the factors that explain observed periods of probation in NCAA Division I-A football over the period 1978-2005. From 1978-1993, but not after, lagged winning percentage, unfilled stadium seats, and years of head coaching experience explain probation. The NCAA changed its enforcement policy in 1993, and football conference stability decreased as well during this period. These changes may explain the reduction in predictability of probation.
|Do Team-Specific Revenues Matter in Baseball’s Arbitration System?
Authors: Phillip A. Miller
|Abstract:According to baseball’s collective bargaining agreement, arbitrators may not consider team finances when rendering a decision. The author develops two theories to examine the setting of final offers. In the first theory, final offers are simply functions of the arbitral criteria and are, therefore, not a function of the revenue-generating capability of the team. In the second theory, the author argues that teams may trade some talented and, thus, high-priced arbitration ineligible players, resulting in an implicit premium embedded in the final offers. The empirical analysis suggests that there are no such premiums embedded in the final offers.
|The Novelty Effect of the New Football Stadia: The Case of Germany
Authors: Arne Feddersen, Wolfgang Maenning, Malte Borcherding
|Abstract:When decisions are made to construct new stadia or to undertake major renovation work, the decision makers often assume that more spectators will be attracted. This so-called “novelty effect?is used as an argument that an impulse towards increased demand for the region and its services will be created, thus justifying public sector management to supply public funding. This study registers the novelty effect of soccer stadia in Germany since the beginning of the Bundesliga (1963-64) up to the end of the 2003-04 season and is based on annual team attendance per game. The data from all 12,488 completed games was used to create the annual attendance per game for each team. A persistent novelty effect of around 2,700 spectators per match (10.7% increase) can be seen. This value is significantly below the values calculated for the US-American professional leagues. The extent to which public funding for soccer stadium buildings can be justified will be small indeed.
|Book Review: The Wages of Wins: Taking Measure of the Many Myths in Modern Sport
Authors: John Charles Bradbury
|Abstract:A book review of The Wages of Wins: Taking Measure of the Many Myths in Modern Sport, by David J. Berri, Martin B. Schmidt, and Stacey L. Brook.