Contents for IJSF Issue 6:2
| Entire issue of IJSF 6:2 Authors: Bernd Frick, Jahn K. Hakes, Chad Turner, Kyle Hutmaker, Jan C. van Ours, Martin A. van Tuijl, Pamela Wicker, Alan Kaplan, John Nadeau, Norm O’Reilly |
| Abstract:This is the entire issue in PDF format that you can download |
| Performance, Salaries and Contract Length: Empirical Evidence from German Soccer, pp. 87-118 Authors: Bernd Frick |
| Abstract:The recent transfers of Christiano Ronaldo from Manchester United, and of Ricardo Izecson dos Santos Leite (Kaká) from Associazione Calcio Milan to Real Madrid—as well as the increasing financial problems of many of the top teams in the big five European leagues—have again increased the public’s attention for the global football players’ labor market. Therefore, the paper addresses two important, and highly contested, issues: player remuneration and contract duration (players are usually considered as overpaid and poorly motivated. Using two different unbalanced panels from the German Bundesliga league that cover six and 13 consecutive seasons respectively (1997-98 to 2002-03 and 1995-96 to 2007-08), I show, first, that the variance in player salaries can be explained, to a large extent, by the variance in individual performance. That is, salaries can be explained by career games played and games played last season, previous and recent international appearances, and goals scored. Moreover, player position, leadership skills, and region of birth clearly matter as well. The impact of these characteristics varies across the salary distribution. Second, I find robust evidence that player performance—measured primarily, but not exclusively, by a subjective overall player rating from Kicker, a highly respected soccer magazine—significantly increases in the last year of the contract. In addition, the variance in player performance is significantly lower in the last year of the contract. These findings suggest that moral hazard is a widespread phenomenon, even in professional soccer. |
| I Don’t Care If I Never Get Back? Time, Travel Costs, and the Estimation of Baseball Season-Ticket Demand, pp. 119-137 Authors: Jahn K. Hakes, Chad Turner, and Kyle Hutmaker |
| Abstract:Many previous attempts to estimate attendance demand for sporting events have concluded that teams with market power are nonetheless pricing tickets in the inelastic portion of the demand curve. These studies, however, have suffered from problems with price and seat quality measurement, multiproduct pricing strategies, and simultaneity in prices and quantities. Using geographically-specific sales data for Atlanta Braves season tickets and multigame ticket packages, we estimate demand for attendance by adopting the travel-cost methodology used in the non-market valuation literature. Using conservative assumptions, our Tobit specification produces point estimates of the price elasticity of demand for full-season ticket packages that are larger in magnitude than those in the early literature and do not reject the null hypothesis of pricing at unit elasticity. We also estimate the income elasticity for ticket packages as being well over 1.0 for full-season ticket packages. |
| Country-Specific Goal-Scoring in the ‘Dying Seconds’ of International Football Matches, pp. 138-154 Authors: Jan C. van Ours and Martin A. van Tuijl |
| Abstract:This paper investigates whether there are country-specific characteristics in goal scoring in the final stage of important international football matches. We examine goal scoring, from 1960 onwards, in full ‘A’ international matches of eight national teams: Argentina, Brazil, England, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Spain. We analyze qualifying matches for the European Championship and World Cup and the matches at the final tournaments of these two events, as well as at the Copa América. We find that Argentina, Germany, and Italy are more likely than the other national teams to score in the last minute, if it is important to do so. However, for Germany, this comes at a cost as it is more likely to concede a goal in the dying seconds of a match than other countries. |
| Willingness-to-Pay in Non-Profit Sports Clubs, pp. 155-169 Authors: Pamela Wicker |
| Abstract:In Germany, some sports clubs increasingly encounter financial problems due to decreasing public subsidies. A way to compensate for the decrease is to increase membership fees. Therefore, the aim of this study is to analyze members’ willingness-topay (WTP) for membership fees and to identify determinants of WTP. For this study, active, adult members (n = 10,013) in 21 sports were surveyed. The results show that members paid an average annual membership fee of 148 and stated an average WTP of 265. The consumer surplus for all sports amounted to 113 on average. The results of the regression analysis reveal that WTP is determined significantly by the current membership fee, personal income, level of education, years of participation, and level of performance. The findings of the study suggest that increasing membership fees might be one option for sports clubs experiencing financial problems. Sport-specific differences have to be considered in this regard. |
| The Hope Statistic as an Alternative Measure of Competitive Balance, pp. 170-184 Authors: Alan Kaplan, John Nadeau, and Norm O’Reilly |
| Abstract:We examine the need for and the presence of competitive balance in professional sports leagues. We argue that competitive balance helps to further fan welfare and we propose a new measure of competitive balance that hopefully better reflects the needs of fans—that is, compared with measures used both currently and in the past. More specifically, we model the hope of postseason play in a new way as a proxy for competitive balance, and, using a database from Major League Baseball, we provide descriptive statistics for our measure alongside a number of other measures currently extant in the literature. We conclude by discussing policy positions that may be derived from our findings. |
